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Abstract 
Employee board representation can serve information dissemination purposes. 
This comment argues that in Germany, which (still) has a bank-oriented financial 
system, transparency may be better served by using codetermination (under 
which up to half of the supervisory board is composed of employees) as an 
information channel, rather than by importing the mandatory disclosure require-
ments that are typical of Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. There are two reasons for 
this. One is that the evidence about the efficiency of mandatory disclosure 
requirements is mixed. The other is that mandatory disclosure is an intrinsic 
component of market-oriented financial systems such as the US financial system. 
Transplanting a market-oriented component into a bank-oriented financial 
system brings the risk of inconsistencies, as it affects the complementarities that 
exist among the intrinsic components of a bank-oriented system. This comment 
thus concludes that before suggesting ways to transplant further mandatory 
disclosure requirements into the German financial system, or improve existing 
ones, one should consider how to use or improve the use of codetermination as an 
information dissemination channel. 
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The debate about the benefits of corporate disclosure requirements has been going 
on for decades. Critics have argued that, from an information supply perspective,
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disclosure mandates inflict excessive costs on smaller firms and are inadequate 
for larger firms, whereas from an information demand perspective creditors and 
investors alike are better served by market mechanisms. 
The empirical evidence, however, remains scarce and mixed.1 For their part, 
securities regulators around the world have imposed disclosure requirements upon 
listed firms.2 The primary objective is to protect public shareholders, but other 
stakeholders obviously also benefit from securities regulation. In addition, various 
corporate laws, in particular in Europe, protect creditors by mandating the 
disclosure of legal capital or financial account information.3 
In recent years, mandating or fostering disclosure has been on the increase in 
Europe. The European Commission, Member States (especially through corporate 
governance codes) and even the European Court of Justice have become propo-
nents of disclosure mechanisms.4 This evolution is related to the ongoing 
transformation of the bank-oriented continental European financial systems into 
market-oriented systems. 
 
 
1. BANK-ORIENTED AND MARKET-ORIENTED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
Firms in bank-oriented systems have so-called “insider” governance regimes 
under which a few players (essentially lenders and controlling shareholders) have 
high incentives to gather information and not much data is made publicly avail-
able. Firms in market-oriented financial systems have so-called “outsider” 
governance regimes where large amounts of information are disseminated 
publicly and incentives to gather additional information are low due to free-rider 
problems. 
—————————————————— 
1 Compare recently P.G. Mahoney and J. Mei, Mandatory vs. Contractual Disclosure in 
Securities Markets: Evidence form the 1930s, Working Paper (2006), available at: <http:// 
www.ssrn.com> (securities laws did not add measurably to the content and credibility of the 
NYSE’s existing disclosure requirements); M. Greenstone, P. Oyer, and A. Vissing-Jørgensen, 
‘Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Act Amendments’, 121 Q. J. 
Econ. (2006) p. 399 (results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to more 
narrowly focus on the maximization of shareholder value); A. Ferrell, The Case for Mandated 
Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, Working Paper (2005), available at: 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu> (mandatory disclosure enhances competition and reduces 
agency costs). 
2 See G. Hertig, R. Kraakman, and E. Rock, ‘Issuers and Investor Protection’, in R. Kra-
akman, et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional Approach 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) p. 197. 
3 G. Hertig and H. Kanda, ‘Creditor Protection’, in Kraakman, et al., op. cit. n. 2, at pp. 79-83. 
4 See H. Merkt, ‘Creditor Protection through Mandatory Disclosure’, in this issue, at s. 3. 
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When capital markets start playing a more important role in jurisdictions that 
traditionally had a bank-oriented financial systems, trade-off issues arise.5 In 
particular, one has to balance the needs of new players, such as institutional 
investors, for better disclosure against the private information needs of (still 
important) traditional players, such as controlling shareholders. 
Getting the right balance is not merely a smoothening of the transition ques-
tion. Two more fundamental determinants have to be taken into account. First, 
one cannot assume convergence towards a “pure” market-oriented system. Even 
in the United States, the prototypical market-oriented jurisdiction, banks do play 
an important role. Conversely, in the prototypical bank-oriented jurisdiction, 
Germany, banks will continue to play a major role for the foreseeable future. In 
other words, we can expect financial systems to evolve towards variable combina-
tions of markets and intermediaries.6 Second, financial systems comprise sets of 
complementary elements.7 It follows that transplanting “capital market” compo-
nents into a transitioning but still bank-oriented financial system may lead to 
inconsistencies that could ultimately lead to financial crisis.8 
Thus, as pointed out by Hanno Merkt,9 the case for creditor protection through 
mandatory disclosure is far from unambiguous. But this is not necessarily because 
the disclosure requirements that have been developed for market-oriented systems 
are overly costly, do not meet market needs or must be reformed with respect to 
comprehensibility, timeliness and enforcement. To be sure, disclosure require-
ments may well deserve improvements. However, it is also critical to consider the 
possibility of making better use of information pools and information channels 
that are typical of bank-oriented systems as an alternative to mandatory disclo-
sure. For example, given the importance of lending in bank-oriented systems, it 
could be more efficient to give banks incentives to make their internal ratings of 
their borrowers available to the public. Or, to take another example, given the 
established governance role of employees in many bank-oriented systems, it 
could be more efficient to channel at least some information through the corporate 
—————————————————— 
5 See F. Allen and D. Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MIT Press 2000) 
pp. 19-21. 
6 See also Allen and Gale, op. cit. n. 5, at pp. 21 and 470. 
7 See already P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ‘Complementarities and Systems: Understanding 
Japanese Economic Organization’, 1 Estudios Economicos (1994) p. 3 et seq. 
8 See R.H. Schmidt and M. Tyrell, ‘What Constitutes a Financial System in General and 
the German Financial System in Particular?’, in J.P. Krahnen and R.H. Schmidt, eds., The 
German Financial System (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 19, 53-7 and 62 
(emphasizing the complementary nature of a bank-dominated financial sector, stakeholder-
oriented corporate governance and risk management through lending-based inter-temporal risk 
sharing). 
9 See Merkt, loc. cit. n. 4, at s. 6. 
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bodies on which employees are represented, such as boards or works councils, 
than to disclose it directly to the public. 
Whether it could prove efficient to provide information to creditors and other 
stakeholders by fostering the disclosure of internal ratings is an issue that will be 
dealt with in an article that is forthcoming in this review.10 This comment will 
focus on the comparative advantages of using corporate bodies that comprise 
human capital representatives, in particular codetermined boards, to inform one 
specific class of creditors, i.e., employees. 
 
 
2. EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS AS INFORMATION CHANNELS 
 
There seems to be no fundamental reason to require managers to be better 
informed in a market-oriented than in a bank-oriented system. In a given industry, 
the relative costs and benefits of information gathering and processing are likely 
to be similar in both systems. On the other hand, the costs and benefits of 
disclosing information held by managers are likely to vary among financial 
systems. 
More specifically, public disclosure requirements are likely to prove less bene-
ficial or costlier for firms in bank-oriented systems than for firms in market-
oriented systems. In bank-oriented systems, information generation depends on its 
remaining internal to a limited number of recipients, whereas in market-oriented 
systems information is externalized through stock prices.11 Hence, public disclo-
sure is less likely to be beneficial in terms of access to external finance for firms 
in bank-oriented systems, as it would reduce lenders’ informational advantage 
and make them less attractive to depositors – leading to loans becoming more 
expensive without certainty about corresponding decreases in the cost of bonds or 
equity.12 Conversely, public disclosure is less likely to be costly for investors in 
market-oriented systems than for controlling shareholders in bank-oriented 
systems – the latter generally requiring the benefit of private information as 
remuneration for their more demanding monitoring role. 
—————————————————— 
10  G. Hertig, ‘Using Basel II to Facilitate Access to Finance: The Disclosure of Internal 
Credit Ratings’, EBOR (forthcoming). 
11  For a comparison of internal (in bank-oriented systems) and external (in market-oriented 
systems) information distribution, see R.H. Schmidt and M. Tyrell, ‘Information Theory and 
the Role of Intermediaries’, in K.J. Hopt, E. Wymeersch, H. Kanda, and H. Baum, eds., 
Corporate Governance in Context, Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and 
the US (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) p. 479 et seq. 
 
12  See, however, R. Elsas and J.P. Krahnen, ‘Universal Banks and Relationship with 
Firms’, in Krahnen and Schmidt, op. cit. n. 8, at pp. 197, 207 (studies on the ability of German 
banks to mitigate financial constraints of large listed firms yield mixed results). 
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There are, on the other hand, at least partial substitutes to public disclosure for 
firms in bank-oriented systems. In such systems, management is monitored 
through stakeholder voice (i.e., shareholder and employee monitoring or decision 
making) rather than through investor entry and exit (i.e., stock price variation and 
hostile takeovers). It follows that it should prove less costly or more profitable to 
provide at least some information through channels such as direct encounters with 
management, board meetings or other stakeholder gatherings than through public 
channels. 
As a matter of fact, it is well known that in bank-oriented systems managers 
provide their lenders and controlling shareholders with significant private 
information, and there is a rich body of academic research dealing with these 
information channels. Corporate governance literature has paid less attention to 
information flows between managers and employees and their impact in terms of 
mandatory disclosure.13 This could simply be because it is perceived that employ-
ees have no relevant governance function. Such a conclusion, however, would 
ignore the large place given to employee board participation across Europe. 
Employees have the right to have representatives on the board of state-owned 
firms in Ireland, Spain and Greece, whereas larger French firms are required to let 
two non-voting worker representatives attend board meetings.14 Scandinavian 
countries, for their part, require boards to include three employee directors, 
whereas boards in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg have even larger employee 
representation.15 
Another explanation for the relative lack of interest in information flows be-
tween managers and employees may be that employee board representation has 
no governance significance, either because employees are not interested in getting 
or providing information or because they are prevented from doing so by the 
other governance players. The informational significance of employee board 
participation is ultimately an empirical question that cannot be resolved here. 
From a theoretical perspective, however, there are reasons to believe that em-
ployee directors can play an important information role. On the one hand, their 
board participation may reduce information asymmetries between executives and 
other employees, thus reducing bargaining costs as well as the risk of strikes.16 On 
the other hand, the presence of employee directors can provide the board with a 
—————————————————— 
13  See, however, M.M. Blair and M.J. Roe, eds., Employees and Corporate Governance 
(Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press 1999). 
14  See H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The Basic Governance Structure’, in Kraakman, et 
al., op. cit. n. 2, at p. 62. 
15  Ibid. 
 
16  See J. Kennan and R. Wilson, ‘Bargaining with Incomplete Information’, 31 J. Econ. Lit. 
(1993) p. 45 et seq. 
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well-informed source of information, which in turn makes the board less depend-
ent on (mandated or voluntary) managerial information.17 
There is thus both statutory and theoretical support for using employee board 
participation as an information channel in (still) bank-oriented continental 
Europe. What remains to be tackled is whether the benefits of this potential 
substitute to public disclosure exceed its costs. Here again, this is ultimately an 
empirical question.18 However, the German codetermination experience allows 
for preliminary conclusions. 
 
 
3. GERMAN CODETERMINATION AS AN EFFICIENT INFORMATION CHANNEL 
 
German law provides for the most extensive employee corporate governance 
participation in Europe. Employees enjoy extensive information, consultation and 
participation rights through works councils, which represent employees at the 
shop floor level (so-called betriebliche Mitbestimmung). In addition, the 1976 
Codetermination Statute (Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer) 
subjects larger firms, and thus those firms that fall within the scope of securities 
regulation, to quasi-parity.19 employee supervisory board representation require-
ments (Unternehmensmitbestimmung). 
Works councils were institutionalized by nineteenth century legislation, 
whereas employee participation beyond the shop floor was introduced at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, with board representation institutionalized in 
the 1950s.20 In spite – or because – of this employee participation tradition, the 
1976 Codetermination Act was strongly opposed before and after its enactment. 
—————————————————— 
17  See M. Osterloh and B. Frey, Shareholders Should Welcome Employees as Directors, 
Working Paper (2005), available at: <http://www.ssrn.com>; A.J. Hilman and Th. Dalziel, 
‘Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence 
Perspectives’, 28 Academy Management Rev. (2003) p. 383 et seq. 
18  The fact that employee board participation is rare in the absence of legal compulsion 
may be caused by the same factors that require disclosure to be mandated to be effective, and is 
therefore not necessarily evidence that such an information distribution channel has costs that 
exceeds its benefits. Compare Hansmann and Kraakman, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 64; C. Wind-
bichler, ‘Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as Corporate 
Governance Conundrum’, 6 EBOR (2005) p. 507 et seq. 
19  There is “quasi-parity” in the sense that while the supervisory board must comprise an 
equal number of shareholder and employee representatives, the chairman is elected by the 
shareholder bench and has the decisive vote when there is a tie. 
 
20  For a concise description of the evolution of employee participation in Germany, see K. 
Pistor, ‘Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities’, in Blair and 
Roe, op. cit. n. 13, at pp. 165-175. 
Codetermination as a (Partial) Substitute for Mandatory Disclosure? 129
The public debate lost steam after Germany’s Constitutional Court upheld the law 
in 1979, and public controversies had practically disappeared by the 1990s.21 
This lack of public debate could reflect the limited practical impact of codeter-
mination. However, empirical studies on the economic effects of codetermination 
are rather scarce and inconclusive.22 This is likely to mean that codetermination is 
either ineffective or has costs that balance its benefits. 
It is quite obvious that codetermination has its disadvantages.23 Unions may 
capture the employee bench and pursue policies that are detrimental to the 
company. Employee participation may increase transaction costs by requiring 
more cumbersome board preparation meetings. Employee representatives may not 
have the required financial and strategic knowledge. They may also have diverg-
ing interests among themselves or be prone to managerial capture. In addition, 
business secrets may be leaked when it is in the private interest of employee 
representatives. Conversely, managers may withhold information from the 
supervisory board under the pretense that confidentiality is critical. Finally, 
employee participation can increase board size to a point where group dynamics 
make it difficult to challenge the firm’s executives. 
Given these disadvantages and the inconclusive empirical evidence, codeter-
mination must also have significant advantages. Labor peace and strike avoidance 
are certainly among them. But these social benefits cannot occur without code-
termination also reducing information asymmetries within firms. In other words, 
—————————————————— 
21  See also O. Riekers and G. Spindler, ‘Corporate Governance: Legal Aspects’, in Krah-
nen and Schmidt, op. cit. n. 8, at pp. 350, 361. 
22  For a review, see M. Becht, P. Bolton, and A. Röell, ‘Corporate Governance and Con-
trol’, in G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R.M. Stulz, Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, Vol. 1A: Corporate Finance (Amsterdam, North-Holland 2002) at s. 7.6.2. See also T. 
Baums and B. Frick, ‘The Market Value of the Codetermined Firm’, in Blair and Roe, op. cit. 
n. 13, at p. 207 et seq. (finding that codetermination does not influence stock prices); F.A. 
Schmid and F. Seger, ‘Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung, Allokation von Entscheidungsrechten und 
Shareholder Value’, 5 Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (1998) at p. 453 et seq. (codetermina-
tion is costly for shareholders); S.N. Kaplan, ‘Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance 
in Germany’, 10 J. Law Econ. Org. (1994) p. 142 et seq. (German firms are not comparatively 
slow in removing poorly performing managers); F.R. FitzRoy and K. Kraft, ‘Economic Effects 
of Codetermination’, 95 Scandinavian J. Econ. (1993) p. 365 et seq. (suggesting overall social 
gains from codetermination, but decreased firm-level profitability); G. Benelli, C. Loderer, and 
T. Lys, ‘Labor Participation in Corporate Policy Decision Making: West Germany’s Experience 
with Codetermination’, 60 J. Bus. (1987) p. 533 et seq. (codetermination has no significant effect); 
J. Svejnar, ‘Codetermination and Productivity: Evidence from the Federal Republic of Germany’, 
63 Rev. Econ. Stat. (1981) p. 188 et seq. (codetermination has no significant effect). 
 
23  For a discussion and specific examples, see Pistor, loc. cit. n. 20, at pp. 188-191; M.J. 
Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) 
at pp. 73-76; K.J. Hopt, ‘Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for 
Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe’, 14 Int. Rev. Law. Econ. (1994) 
pp. 203, 205-212. 
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it cannot be denied that German codetermination has an information channel 
function. 
What remains open is its role in a changing environment. The recent revival of 
the public debate about the value of codetermination shows that its costs and 
benefits may be affected by employees having more valuable firm-specific 
knowledge in an information society and by ongoing changes in German owner-
ship structures, financial systems, product competition and corporate ethics. 
German executives have recently expressed concerns about the rising costs of 
codetermination in a more market-oriented environment. Their complaints have 
been balanced by reports about the increasing benefits of codetermination. Hence, 
it is said that, these days, employee representatives sent from the works councils 
bring beneficial operational knowledge to the board. Moreover, employee 
representatives (including those designated by the unions) are allegedly more 
open to restructurings and less inclined to favor social benefits over the corpora-
tion’s interest. In short, it is argued that “codetermination practices are becoming 
more micro-focused and insider-oriented.”24 Finally, and most importantly, it is 
argued that being a member of the supervisory board nowadays gives broad 
access to any relevant firm information.25 
It thus appears that codetermination could well prove a better information 
channel in the current environment than in the past. The significance of this 
channel and the question whether its contribution could be improved by amending 
existing codetermination rules deserves further analysis. What cannot be disputed, 
however, is that codetermination has informational advantages while being an 
intrinsic component of the (still) predominantly bank-oriented German financial 
system. Conversely, it cannot be disputed that the evidence about the efficiency of 
mandatory disclosure requirement is mixed, and that it is an intrinsic component 
of market-oriented financial systems. It follows that before suggesting ways to 
transplant mandatory disclosure requirements into a bank-oriented system, one 
should consider how to use or improve information channels inherent to bank-
oriented systems – including codetermination. 
In sum, while Hanno Merkt makes an important point about the need to estab-
lish whether and how mandatory disclosure is beneficial to creditors, one should 
also consider whether and how codetermination and related mechanisms could be 
used as information channels between the firm and one important category of 
creditors: employees. 
—————————————————— 
24  See G. Jackson, M. Höpner, and A. Kurdelbusch, Corporate Governance and Employees 
in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions, Working Paper (2005), 
available at: <http://www.ssrn.com>. 
 
25  See C. Leuz and J. Wüstemann, ‘The Role of Accounting in the German Financial Sys-
tem’, in Krahnen and Schmidt, op. cit. n. 8, at pp. 450, 464. 
